Did you know you can see shit political economy from space?

 

Auckland: Eden Terrace's workers' cottages on the right, Mt Eden's California Bungalows 

beginning over the railway line lower left. (Photo showing the area before the Dominion Rd flyover,

from the Sir George Grey Special Collections, Auckland Libraries, 580-9498']

Did you know you can see shit political economy from space? Here below is the Black Hole of North Korea at night, too poor to have enough lights to switch on.

And you can see shit political economy in Auckland too, in aerial photographs. To be accurate: you can see shit political economy in the form of the effect of tariffs. ...

Let me explain.

Workers' cottage, Freeman's Bay

Victorian Villa, Grey Lynn

The first houses built here en masse were workers' cottages and then villas. When you fly over the city, you can see a ring of these villas around the inner parts of the city — especially so in Ponsonby and Grey Lynn — built right up until the First World War.

But after that war, something changed. It seemed to some that the United States had rescued Europe from its Great War, and had a lifestyle to which an increasingly prosperous population could aspire. It was the Jazz Age — the age of radio, electrification, automobiles, and the mass production (Fordism!) that made them affordable. In love with Americanism, in housing here it became the decade of the California Bungalow.

California Bungalow, Mt Eden

A villa is not a bungalow.  Like the California lifestyle it aped (and which the world would fully fall in love with after another war), the California Bungalow was freer than the more uptight Victorian villa, and reached out for sun and air. Their broad spreading gables form a second ring around the city in what we now call the "tram suburbs," a ring from Pt Chev through Mt Albert, Sandringham, Mt Eden, Greenlane, Ellerslie, and right around to the border of Meadowbank/Remuera.

Their popularity was immense. 

Their takeover seemed unstoppable. 

Until something happened.

That something involved a tariff. Brought in by US Senators Smoot and Hawley, their Smoot Hawley Tariff Act raised tariffs on imports by an average of twenty percent. Their intention (we're told) was to quarantine American manufacturers from the effects of the 1929 stock market crash. What it did do instead was to spread the misery and contagion around the globe, kicking off the Great Depression and all but shutting down international trade for nearly two decades.

John Bell Condliffe's "wagon wheel" showing the dramatic death spiral of world trade
following the disastrous implementation of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act

New Zealand economist J.B. Condliffe has a world-famous diagram describing the accelerating downward spiral of trade as every country and trading bloc in the world put up their own tariff walls in response. It was one of the most successful acts of intentional self-destruction in all modern history.*

Almost at a stroke, we fell out of love with the US.  In Britain, still the head of something called an Empire, an Imperial Preferences Act was swiftly passed making trade within the Empire roughly tariff-free — allowing many Commonwealth countries to escape the Depression first. (Not so the US of A, which had to wait until the death of a President and the end of a war to boom again.)

And trade amongst the Empire, rather than outside it, meant many more British goods replacing the previous love affair with American. Not least in housing. If the twenties was the decade of the California Bungalow, then the thirties was the decade of the English Cottage/English Revival. We can see these crabby, restrained offerings around the outer parts of the tram suburbs. (And you can see all these styles described in the Auckland Council's 'Style Guide,' pp 14-24)

In insulating itself from the world, America had not only shot itself in the foot economically, it also lost its influence with the rest of the world. 

Turned out it was a not-so-great way to Make America Go Away Again.

* * * *

* Until April 2, 2025, that is, with what Johan Norberg calls "the longest suicide note in economic history."

UPDATE 1: David Farrar notes that our average two-percent tariff rate (world's second-lowest after Singapore) becomes in the mind of the Toddler-in-Chief a twenty-percent tariff. (I use the word "mind" loosely.)

Johan Norberg has more on the effects of what he jokingly calls '"Liberation Day June 17 1930":

As he says, " I think the US was heading for trouble even before, but it certainly deepened the depression and spread it around the world, with devastating effects for European democracies. We would have had a depression anyway, but perhaps not a great one."

UPDATE 2: 

"Thomas Rustici identified the role of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in exacerbating the Great Depression, particularly through its effects on trade, banking failures, and economic contraction. His seminal work, *Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis* (2005), presents a compelling argument that Smoot-Hawley initiated a trade war, triggered mass bankruptcies, destabilized the banking system, and led to deflation and depression. ... 

"Conclusion Rustici’s work provides one of the most comprehensive and rigorous explanations of how the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act triggered a trade war, bankrupted farmers and businesses, destabilized the banking system, and created deflationary collapse. His analysis is central to understanding how protectionist policies can create economic catastrophe by disrupting credit, trade, and monetary liquidity. His insights remain critical in debates over trade policy and economic crises."

John Key: "...he served himself and not the nation."

Cartoon by Richard McGrail from The Free Radical

"Something which has puzzled me in recent years is the ... dismissive attitude to the John Key government as wasted years. ... The light dawned when 'The Herald' published an astonishingly ignorant but revealing article by Key on why, if an American he’d vote for Trump. ... In a nutshell Key said ... Trump’s promised tax cuts would suffice to determine his vote.
    "The extraordinary thing about Key’s article was its astonishing shallowness. ... 
    "It was only after reading Key’s article that I finally comprehended [the] steadfast derision for the Key years, specifically the wasted opportunity to make meaningful and desired changes ...
    "His likeable affability aided by a wallowing Labour Party saw him able to coast along, enjoying being Prime Minister but blowing the opportunity to make meaningful change. In that sense he served himself and not the nation and ... condemnation has been 100% correct.
    "It’s now evident Key saw being Prime Minister solely in the context of a personal career highlight experience rather than any wider desire to build a better nation."

~ Bob Jones from his post. [Link added]

"The continuing acceptance of a rebellious monarchy is a curious feature of [modern] New Zealand."

 

Tawhiao, the second kingi

 

"[W]ith the death of [Tuheitia] and the anointment of his daughter as the new [kingitanga] leader, it is an important time to consider the place of that separatist movement in the New Zealand story. 
    "The idea of a Maori king was presented, and defeated, in the Waikato at two great hui of 1857 and 1858 when a majority held on to the promise of loyalty to the British Crown, and the rights that resulted. The activists withdrew and announced the great warrior Te Wherowhero (Potatau) now an aging man who was to die less than two years later, as their king. Te Wherowhero (1858-1860) was abused, kept as a virtual prisoner, and his opinions were ignored. 
    "His son, Tawhiao (1860-1894) believed that he was indeed a king; a separate territory was asserted and Government agents were expelled by force, against the wishes of those who were benefitting from the aid that they had requested. 
    "After that rebellion was defeated, Tawhiao remained defiant, declaring in 1876 that 'I have the sole right to conduct matters in my land – from the North Cape to the southern end.' That challenge was ignored and he was left to continue his activities. He set up a parallel government, and a bank, and in 1893 the kingite government posted notices advising that 'Pakeha as well as Maori were subject to "the laws of the Government of the Kingdom of Aotearoa".' The continuing acceptance of a rebellious monarchy is a curious feature of [modern] New Zealand."

~ John Robinson, from his article 'Just Equality: The simple path from confusion to common sense'

Kawanatanga katoa > tino rangatiratanga

 

"'There’s no doubt that both Māori and Pākehā in 1840 understood tino rangatiratanga to be a bigger deal than kāwanatanga” [says an idiot called Hooton]. However whilst this is undoubtedly the modernist position on how we should interpret the Treaty, the historical evidence suggests something very different.
    "Article One of the Treaty states that the chiefs agreed to 'give absolutely to the Queen of England forever, the complete Government (Kāwanatanga katoa) over their land' ... 
    "[T]hat little word katoa ... is rarely mentioned. But it means complete, all-encompassing, totally, without exception. It’s no wonder [that in 1840] it focussed the minds of the chiefs on the issue of Crown authority. ...
    "Nowhere in the historical records do we find any indication that either the chiefs or the Pākehā protagonists understood anything other than that Kāwanatanga katoa meant the Crown was being established as the pre-eminent governing authority in the land. ...
    "'Te Kawenata Hou' (the 'Māori New Testament') ... would have had significant influence on how the chiefs understood the Treaty. ... In 'Te Kawenata Hou' the term rangatira is a general term for leadership. In contrast kawana is a very specific term used to denote governors who represent the authority of kings. To use [the] example of Pilate – as the kawana (governor) he represented the sovereignty of the Roman empire in Jerusalem. He had the authority to tax and to execute judgement. The local Jewish leaders who wanted Jesus crucified had to get his permission. Those leaders are described in Te Kawenata Hou as rangatira. From this the chiefs at Waitangi would have quickly understood what was being proposed in the Treaty. And it certainly did not involve them retaining 'absolute sovereignty'."

~ Ewen McQueen from his post 'Kāwanatanga katoa was the fundamental question at Waitangi'

'Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning'

 

"The suggestion that colonial systems are based on white supremacy is a generalisation that infects much of the debate about colonialism and colonisation. It suggests that 'white supremacy' ... was what motivated colonialism and colonisation. It did not, although there were times when, during the colonial experience, it manifested itself. ...
    "In 2017, [Nigel] Biggar initiated a five-year project at Oxford University ... to scrutinise critiques against the historical facts of empire. Historians and academics widely criticised the project ... 
    "Biggar’s book Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning, examines the morality of colonialism. ... conced[ing] in the Introduction to the book that the subject matter and his approach were both contentious. ...

"Many commentators of colonialism approach the topic from a critical theory perspective, seeking out any evidence to then suggest that all colonial activity was inherently evil. Biggar does not. His is a more nuanced approach and is that of an ethicist.  ...
    'Biggar’s argument is that the development of Empire and what is called colonialism was an institution that developed over centuries and no one could say that it was wholly good or wholly bad. Biggar cites examples from other imperial activities. The empire of Islam demonstrated examples of racism regarding those from Northern climes (it was too cold to be intelligent) or the tropics (it was too hot to be intelligent). ... 

"He commences with the proposition that empire is not an historical aberration or a departure from historical norms. It is part of the natural order of a world that, until recently, lacked stable frontiers formalised by an overarching scheme of international law. The armed migration of peoples in search of resources might serve to unlock the riches of the world and spread knowledge and technical competence, processes which potentially benefit all mankind.
    "Certainly colonialism severely disrupted existing patterns of indigenous life. It was often achieved or maintained through violence and injustice. In the final analysis, all states maintain themselves by force or the threat of it.
    "Governments, imperial or domestic, have always involved light and shade, achievement and failure, good and evil. Biggar’s point is that it falsifies history to collect together everything bad about an institution and serve it up as if it were the whole.

"There are three major points that Biggar makes by way of mitigation when it comes to the legacy of Empire.
    "To begin with many of the worst things that happened were not the result of an ideology or a preconceived and calculated policy. There were abuses. They were recognised and were addressed although not always with the greatest success.
    "Secondly, along with the disruption that was caused to communities there were also benefits. Practices such as slavery, cannibalism, sati and human sacrifice, which were by any standards barbarous, were eliminated. The ground was laid for an economic and social transformation that lifted much of the world out of extremes of poverty.
    "Thirdly and finally not only did colonialism bring disruption but it brought order. The British brought the Rule of Law, constitutional government, honest administration, economic development and modern educational and research facilities, all long before they would have been achieved without European intervention. ...

"There can be no doubt that the British Empire contained evils and injustices but so does the history of any long-standing state. But the Empire was not essentially racist, exploitative or wantonly violent as a general proposition. It could correct errors and sins and importantly it prepared colonised peoples for liberal self-government.
    "What colonialism did bring to the table in the final analysis were liberal, humanitarian principles and endeavours that should be admired and carried into the future. Imaginary guilt should not cripple the self confidence of the British, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders as pillars of the liberal international order."

~ A Halfling from his post 'Colonialism - A Moral Reckoning'

Land, the rights and wrongs of it

 "Although the Pakeha have progressively acquired land, they have always argued about the rights and wrongs of it. That remains true even today. Many Pakeha New Zealanders sympathise with the view (which is taught in schools) that the Maori have been shamefully dispossessed. They join Maori land marches and protests. The present Government declares itself sympathetic to the Māori case, and looks to compensate where past wrongs are clearly manifest. But Pakeha go on buying Māori land. And though Maori insist that for them the land has a spiritual value which the Pakeha does not understand they go on selling it. Their sense of its spiritual value is always sharpest once the material value has been realised — and that has always been the case."

~ C.K. Stead, from his review of Witi Ihimaera's 1986 novel The Matriarch

Ned Fletcher's book: "unsatisfactory" and "badly flawed"

 

New Zealand/Australian historian Bain Attwood reviews Ned Fletcher's English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi in the Australian Book Review. His conclusion: "unsatisfactory" and "badly flawed."

Attwood was raised in New Zealand and is a professor of history at Melbourne's Monash University, thus giving him both local knowledge and a less myopic perspective on Treaty issues than most locally-based historians. His most recent books (A Bloody Difficult Subject: Ruth Ross, te Tiriti o Waitangi and the Making of History and Empire and the Making of Native Title) also demonstrate he has put that wider perspective to good use.

Fletcher, he says, writes more as lawyer than historian, handling his material like a legal brief, with all the flaws evident without an opposing counsel to point out omissions and elisions. Fletcher, for example (emphases mine), "adduces practically all the relevant historical sources and [citing] at great length those parts of them that seem to support it" — he "painstakingly rebuts each and every argument contrary to his own, or at least those he finds useful to acknowledge" – if that's not bad enough, Attwood also accuses him of omitting "any thorough consideration of important points that tend to undermine the cogency of his argument" – and he also "neglects to discuss in any thoroughgoing way those parts of the historical record that draw his claims into question." Ouch! 

"By using these tricks," says Attwood, "he might well convince unwitting readers." He has. Many of them, as an Ockham book award and a quick Google search will indicate. (But as other more perceptive reviews or comments indicate — Philip Temple's, Braunias's, Brian Easton's my own [ahem]— you can't fool all the people all of the time.) Part of the reason, perhaps, is the imprimatur of the publisher, Bridget Williams Books. Part his own familial imprimatur – his mother being the former Chief Justice. And perhaps the major part is the ease with which Fletcher's interpretation melds with fashionable political interests.

Nonetheless, as Attwood makes clear, "Fletcher’s argument is badly flawed. In large part this is because it rests on a series of dubious assertions or assumptions that he does not seek to test and which obscure several awkward historical facts." These include:

Soon after making the Treaty, the British Crown claimed possession of New Zealand (or parts of it) on grounds other than the Treaty, including the legal doctrine of discovery. The imperial government sought to assume sovereignty by making an agreement with many local chiefs, even though it regarded them as neither fully sovereign nor owners of all the land. It did so for reasons that were as much diplomatic and political as they were legal and moral, and so were inherently pragmatic rather than simply principled in nature. It instructed its agent to make a treaty that only had two conditions: the Māori were to cede sovereignty to the British Crown as well as the pre-emptive (that is, sole) right to purchase land. There is no evidence to suggest that it envisaged the agreement that was subsequently made with some of the chiefs as one that was meant to provide the basis for the colony’s legal and political arrangements at the time, let alone in the future.

Fletcher's argument also rests, says, Attwood,  "on three especially problematic claims":

1. that the meaning of any text such as the Treaty of Waitangi can be discovered merely by considering the purpose or intent of those who are said to be its authors, rather than contemplating how that text was received, not least by Māori; 
2. that the meaning that might have been bestowed on the Treaty at the time it was made, rather than the discussion and debate that has taken place about it since, best accounts for its historical significance in the sense of both meaning and importance; and 
3. that the original (1840) understanding of the Treaty is more important than any later understandings of it, historically speaking. 

Not one of these propositions, he concludes, can withstand critical scrutiny. "They reveal a loss of perspective about the making of the Treaty in 1840 that characterises much of the historical discussion and debate about it." A loss of perspective that it is probably easier to see from across the Tasman.

In my own review I suggested Fletcher was slippery. Attwood also suggests that Fletcher simply fails to "engage with and thus alert lay readers to the most important historical scholarship of the last twenty or so years." Especially so to scholarship   with views at odds with his own. This 

draws his argument into question and/or undermines his publisher’s claim that this book is a ground-breaking scholarly contribution to understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Among that scholarship that Fletcher either 'overlooks' or fails to adequately engage (cited in Attwood's book on Ruth Ross's seminal 1972 article) is

•  J.G.A. Pocock's 'The treaty between histories' (2002), 
• Andrew Sharp's 'Recent Juridical and Constitutional Histories of Māori' (2001), 
• Alan Ward's 'Historical Method and Waitangi Tribunal Claims' (1996) [in Miles Fairburn, W. H. Oliver & Peter Munz (eds.), The Certainty of Doubt: Tributes to Peter Munz] 
• Paul McHugh's 'Law, History and the Treaty of Waitangi, (NZJH, 1997), 
• Lyndsay Head's 'The Pursuit of Modernity in Māori Society' (2001), 
• Michael Belgrave's Historical Frictions: Māori Claims and Invented Histories (2005), 
• Mark Hickford's Lords of the Land: Indigenous Property Rights and the Jurisprudence of Empire (2011), and 
• Stuart Banner's Possessing the Pacific: Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People from Australia to Alaska (2007).

 A lot of careful scholarship to ignore.

Attwood concludes:

This tome is undoubtedly a prodigious piece of research, but in seeking to account for the British government’s purpose in making the Treaty, its author is unwilling or unable to distinguish the wood from the trees. The result is a remarkably turgid work, the publication of which is somewhat puzzling, given its publisher has an enviable reputation for presenting a good deal of New Zealand’s finest historical scholarship to lay audiences.