Monday, 29 January 2024

Fisking the Treaty Principles debate


Cartoon by Nick Kim

Remember "fisking"?


It's what you feel you have to do sometimes -- not so much to refute idiocies, as to reveal the bad thinking that causes them. Especially if that bad thinking is shared so widely.


Here below is some bad thinking that's shared widely, so I thought I'd do some fisking. Here's the context:

Last week Rawiri Waititi leaked a Ministry of Justice report said to prefigure the Coalition Government's proposed Treaty Principles Bill, which he, the report's author, and TV1 News all say "are at odds with what the Treaty of Waitangi" actually says."

Here's what the relevant bit of the leaked Treaty Principles Bill says:


And here then is a "lecturer in Te Tiriti o Waitangi" who agrees the principles in the leaked Bill have got it all wrong:

So let's follow his arguments and see if he's right.

But first, some history: why does so much law reference "Treaty Principles" rather than the Treaty/Te Tiriti? Simple answer: because from the time of the Fourth Labour Government, governments have been adding at the head of most important legislation words like "must have regard to the principles the Treaty of Waitangi." And because no government then or since have been buying a fight, and also because then Attorney-General Geoffrey Palmer thought that law needed to be vague so that it could be flexible, no bastard ever bothered to define in law what those principles are. So the courts tried to do the job instead, making a complete fustercluck of it, adding nonsense like "partnership," and "participation." (Long story here, if you're interested.) And so, ever since then, embedded at the head of most of the country's important legislation, are weasel words that remain essentially undefined. (Here it is for instance embedded as part of the Purposes and Principles of the RMA.)


Now, as any good lawyer should understand, embedding undefined weasel words into the head of legislation goes against the principle of good objective law. To remind you, good objective law is clear, precise, predictable, contextual, and rights-based. This is none of the above.

So the Coalition Government's proposed Treaty Bill -- alright, let's be honest, David Seymour's bill -- seeks to change all that, change it at least by adding precision to principles that, at the moment, have none. NOTE: the Bill does not seek to change The Treaty/Te Tiriti; it aims instead to change these undefined principles written into so much of New Zealand's law.

That's what Section 8, above, is referring to. It says that the aim of this Treaty Principles Bill is to give to existing legislation both certainty and clarity, so that the written law means what it is intended to mean, not what it could be taken to mean.

Got that? Alright then.

So let's see what our Tiriti lecturer has to say about this, and answer his claims one by one. (His claims in purple; my responses in italics.)

He says that the leaked document "confirms that the government's intention here is not to define the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi but to erase them."

If you've followed what I said above, you'll already see that's not the case. As long as those "principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi" remain embedded in so much law, they need to be properly and objectively defined. Which is Seymour's aim.

He says "the intention is to replace the existing principles with three new ones, which are supposedly based on the three articles of the Treaty."

See. Even he doesn't think they're going to be "erased." That was just him jacking up his argument for effect.

"The problem," he says, "is that the 'new' principles don't remotely resemble what Te Tiriti (or even the Treaty) actually says."

Two claims there: that neither English Treaty nor Māori Tiriti "remotely resemble" what the principles in the proposed Bill say. Do you get the sense already he's jacking up the argument again ... ?

See, the Treaty/Te Tiriti has three Articles. They've very short -- which doesn't make them clear -- and they're in two different languages -- but there is at least general agreement on the subject of each clause.

Subject of the First Article is governance, or sovereignty. Subject of the Second is land and resources. Subject of the Third is rights. (As with all good law, the earlier Articles take precedence.)

So let's see what his argument is for the Bill's principles not "remotely" resembling the Treaty's/Tiriti's ...

First off, he says, "the paper uses the term kāwanatanga to say that the govt have the right to govern all New Zealanders. This is a complete fabrication - as scholars like Margaret Mutu have repeatedly said the term kāwanatanga in Te Tiriti gave the Crown a limited power to govern its own people."
He agrees at least that kāwanatanga means governance. And so does Margaret Mutu. Mutu says however, "That kāwanatanga was for Pākehā," She says, "It was never intended for us." And she does say it repeatedly. But saying it does not argue for it.

The Treaty (English text) say that chiefs "give absolutely ... the complete government over their land." Tiriti says "tuku rawa atu" (literally: relinquish; very; away) "ake tonu atu" (from below upwards; permanent; away) "kāwanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua" (governorship; completely, without exception; they/them; land). 

That's fairly clear. The only thing undefined there really is that word "kāwanatanga," a missionary neologism (governorship) which Māori would have understood from the power of Roman governors displayed in 'Te Kawenata Hou' ('The New Testament') and from having visited New South Wales and seeing the power there that governor exercised. That this was well understood is evidenced from the discussions at the Treaty signing, where rangatira showed they understood that agreement would mean the Kāwana having police power over them, for example -- "If thou stayest as Governor, then," said Te Kemara, then, "perhaps, [I] will be judged and condemned. Yes, indeed, and more than that--even hung by the neck." This would be puzzling if signatories understood things the way Mutu says they did. 
Because kāwanatanga exercised only over Pākeha would not give the kāwana this power. So Margaret Mutu and others will need to explain how governorship that clearly gives coercive power over everyone, including rangatira if necessary -- which is what signatories understood kāwanatanga to mean -- means instead that it gives limited power and only over Pākeha. She doesn't, and can't.

 Next, our Tiriti lecturer says, "The paper then uses 'tino rangatiratanga' to say that all NZers can exercise chieftainship of their land and property. This is just incoherent. That's not what the term means in tikanga or in state law. Tino rangatiratanga is a power of collective self-determination for Māori."

Two claims there: First, that "tino rangatiratanga" is only for Māori. And on that, in 1840, he's exactly right. (Should it stay that way? Read on.)

Second, that both "tikanga" and "state law" say that "tino rangatiratanga" means "collective self-determination." Well, not quite. "State law" and practice does sometimes suggest it as "a framework from which Māori have continued to challenge governments for recognition of our individual and collective self-determination," so it's certainly an aspirational meaning. And that's sometimes how the courts have decided to interpret this. But that doesn't mean that it did say that at the time, or that it has to say it now. (State law is nothing if not mutable.) 

Translating it however even back in 1989, Hugh Kawharu rendered it simply as "unqualified chieftainship." Far from being incoherent, the Bill retains that idea.

But in what way should that chieftainship be directed? For a start, Article Two is about land and resources. (It comes in a natural order from Article One, explaining what sovereignty is for; in this case, to protect land and resources). This is most clear in Article Two (Part Two), which is about how land and resources will be sold, if owners want to. (This part was most important to the colonising government.) And Article Two (Part One) says that government will protect that land and those resources if they don't desire to sell. 

Importantly, it also promises this not just to chiefs, but also to "families and individuals [original English text]/"the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand" [Kawharu translation]. This was pretty neat, at the time. (And, yes, at the time "all the people of New Zealand" only referenced tangata māori. And that's because that's who was being asked to sign.)

So that sets the context for what "chieftainship" means in Article Two. Because it can mean many things, based on the agency and power chiefs then had: power, ownership, independence, autonomy, liberty even. But in this Article, Article Two, the context is clearly land and resources. So in this context "unqualified chieftainship" means, as per the English text, that possession of lands and resources would continue "full exclusive and undisturbed," with all the independence and autonomy therefrom, just as long as owners (chiefs, families, individual NZers) didn't want to sell them to the government.

And that's what the Bill attempts to specify as the principle behind this Article Two: that it is about government promising to protect the property rights of all signatories. (And now, by extension, all New Zealanders.) And since no-one now would to enforce a law allowing land to only be sold to the government, it wisely ignores Article Two (Part Two). (As does our lecturer.) And it takes the liberty of extending this protection to all NZers (since, as a principle, it's a good one.)

Mind you, it doesn't specify it as an individual right, which is a pity. But neither does it specify it to be a collective right, since it can't be. Why? Well we're all aware by now (or should be) that both Treaty/Tiriti and contemporary activists confuse and fudge the difference between individual rights (which governments are properly set up to protect) and so-called "collective rights," which only make sense as individual rights voluntarily delegated. (Q: Why do they fudge? A: Because it grants tribal leaders semi-feudal privileges.)

But we do know that the Treaty's framers were unfortunately equally confused. Translator Henry Williams told signatories at Waitangi that Article Two (Part One) "confirms and guarantees to the chiefs and the tribes, and to each individual native, their full rights as chiefs, their rights of possession of their lands, and all their other property of very kind or degree." You can see the confusion right away. The actual drafting is just as confused. But that doesn't make it right.

Williams's explanation however is helpful, because it makes clear that despite the confusion, an individual property right is still being offered. And that's essentially what the leaked Bill is offering to make clear now.

Our Tiriti lecturer continues: "The 'new' article 3 then says all NZers are equal under the law with the same rights and duties. A nice idea (it'd be cool if my Māori whānau had the same life expectancy as my non-Māori whānau but heoi ano), but that's not what Te Tiriti says. Article 3 is a right of equity."
Several confusions here.  
First, this is not at all a "new" Article Three. As above, it's intended to clarify law in places in which "the principles of the Treaty/Tiriti" has been inserted. 

Second, ensuring to all individuals "the same rights and duties" is not at all the same as ensuring to them all the same outcomes. Much could and has been written on the difference between equality before the law, and equality of outcome, and this isn't the place to replicate it.

But it is the place to make clear that what Article Three offers in the English text is equality before the law ("all the rights and privileges of British subjects"), in the Williams explanation it is also equality before the law ("all the rights and privileges of British subjects") and in the Kawharu translation it is still and remains equality before the law ("the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England"). 

It's true that Kawharu argues that the discussion at the Treaty signing about Hobson being a "father" to signatories suggests a focus on outcomes, or on "equity." But I argue that the repeated use of the “father” figure there is used less in the sense of someone to care over their every need, but more in the sense of either stern judge and a peacemaker, echoing the words of Tamati Waka Nene (harking back perhaps to the need for a mediator after recent wars) and also in the sense of being a teacher or wise adult from the outer world to allow them to learn and grow. Pumuka, for example, chief of the Roroa Tribe, has this sense when he says: "I wish to have two fathers - thou and Busby, and the missionaries." From the latter two he and his colleagues have already learned “Christianity and the Law,” he says (a major theme later at the Kohimarama conference) and they've seen and embraced the cultural change therefrom. 

The astute reader will also notice there is a difference between "duties" (per Kawharu) and "privileges" (per Williams and the English text), and it's the former that the Bill plumps for. Which is a shame, since "duties" suggests that government can make us behave in ways of its own choosing. It's a particular shame the word used wasn't "responsibilities," which would make clear who's responsible for outcomes over one's own life. In the formulation of one Ian Fraser several years ago,
"individuals are the rightful owners of their own lives and therefore have inherent rights and responsibilities; and ... the proper purpose of government is to protect such rights and not to assume such responsibilities."
That would make things plainer, perhaps. But that's not what Te Tiriti says. More's the pity.

Our Tiriti lecturer continues: "As this [TV One] article says, the govt's own officials have said the Bill is in breach of both the spirit and the text of the Treaty. That's a fairly direct statement but it's completely warranted. In my opinion this is the most direct attack on Māori by the govt in a generation." 
Government officials say all sorts of things. And these government officials are leaking, so clearly they don't agree with it. But, frankly, we're all entitled to form our own personal view of whether or not the Bill is in breach of either or both the spirit and text or, if indeed, it affirms them. After all, we all have agency, right?

Is it an attack on Māori? I can see that some individuals in Māoridom would see it that way -- especially those who have been granted legal privileges under the court's present principles. (To paraphrase Thomas Sowell, those granted extra-legal privileges are apt to howl when they're taken away.) 

But if it is an attack, I would characterise it instead as an attack on bad law-making, and an attempt to correct it before extra-legal privileges become cemented in -- if they haven't already. 

Continuing... "The great shame is that rangatiratanga can be good for everyone. The exercise of rangatiranga in the lockdowns kept people safe. Kaupapa Māori orgs led the vaccination effort. Our rivers and lakes are always healthier when Māori share decisions. There are so many examples."

I agree, rangatiratanga can be good for everyone, if and only if the meaning of  rangatiratanga can be agreed upon. Rangatiranga as liberty is very agreeable, and good for all. Rangatiranga as rights of ownership is also good for all. Folk exercising agency individually and voluntarily did help reduce the spread of COVID. Organisations everywhere, from iwi agencies to pharmacies, vaccinated thousands -- and were paid to do so -- and good on them. Our rivers and lakes are healthier when property rights are protected -- as this proposed clarification of the principles of Article Two might help to do. And more affordable homes can be built when rights to one's own land are recognised in law ... As he says, there are so many examples.

He concludes by saying "Te Tiriti" can be good for us all. 

That is possible. But it might first take some clarification.

Here's the Swell Maps:



NB: I've taken both the English text of The Treaty and Williams's explanation of Te Tiriti from Ned Fletcher's book The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi (reviewed here). Hugh Kawharu's semi-official translation of Te Tiriti appears at the Waitangi Tribunal site.


Friday, 26 January 2024

BOOK REVIEW: 'The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi' by Ned Fletcher



WAY BACK IN THE LATE 1830s, these small islands down at the bottom of the South Pacific had eyes on them from the other side of the world. From that distance, it was looking to two parties in particular as “a part of the Australian frontier” that cried out for the conquering. “For it was at once the favourite of the systematic colonisers” (who wished to buy land and have occupied as much of it as they could sell) and at the same time it was also “the favourite of the missionary societies” – who wished to delay colonisation while they imparted to those living here the rudiments of “religious improvement and civilisation.”[1]

The officials at Britain’s Colonial Office eventually recognised that it might be their role to mediate between these two competing “conceptions of Imperialism.” Sympathising with the latter group, yet kicked abruptly into action by the deeds of the former, their solution was a Treaty between their Queen Victoria and the New Zealand natives to whom her uncle had granted his protection four years before. “[T]he real aim” of this Treaty says one historian “was to transfer from individuals and voluntary associations to the Imperial Government the responsibility for the colonisation of New Zealand,” making it their business to “mediate with authority between colonists and natives.”[2]

Until now, the Treaty has been studied primarily in its Māori version, Te Tiriti, with the English text considered to be either lost or “unknowable” or irrevocably irreconcilable with the Māori text. A 2022 book that has been making waves aims to overturn all that. That book, The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi by Ned Fletcher, is a monumental but worthwhile read.

I made time over the summer break to read it, and I’m glad I did. Thoroughly researched and fully documented, Fletcher’s The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi is quite simply the new interpretation of the Treaty with which we are all going to have to wrestle -- so it’s as well you get to grips with it as soon as you can.

It shouldn't be a chore. It's a joy to read – and like all books by Bridget Williams Books it is beautifully presented. Some of the author’s turns of phrase are delightful – about James Busby, for instance, we read that he was something of the Mr Micawbers, remaining optimistic throughout his time here as British Resident “that his latest dispatch would convince the Colonial Office to agree with his views, and that vindication would be received with the next mail.” And his eye for a juicy quote is well honed: on the Marquess of Normanby, whose instructions to Hobson formed the basis of the Treaty, Fletcher tells us it was said at his death that he was “one of the men who are clever boys and nothing more. There was, in his early life, a promise of excellence, both literary and political, but the promise has never been fulfilled.”[3] And on those instructions themselves, he says “Trevor Williams was hardly exaggerating when he wrote that Normanby contributed only his signature to Hobson’s instructions.”[4]

The story is worth telling and Fletcher makes it easy to follow. The book’s structure ably leads the reader through the tale of how and by whom (and why) the Treaty was written – Parts One and Two (respectively ‘The British Empire’ and ‘The Path to British Intervention in New Zealand’) give the full context that led to its production; Part Three (‘Making a Treaty’) takes us though its drafting and signing; and Part Four (Contesting the Treaty’) outlines developments since.

He has chapters on the history and developement of the British Empire and the Colonial Office, chapters on “British sovereignty and native government” in Canada, Australia, and other territories comparing threatment and Treaties there, and chapters on post-Treaty debates here and elsewhere that help illuminate what the English text means. All of which are thoroughly documented, well explained, and fascinating – especially important in that it places NZ’s colonisation and Treaty in context with those elsewhere in the Empire and beyond.

To my mind he could usefully have added one more chapter: a historically-based discussion on the development of and the mid-nineteenth century understanding of individual rights and property rights, both so important in understanding the Treaty context – and what exactly the framers would have meant by the word “rights.” 

Two points in particular from such a chapter would, in my estimation, have changed his own concluding chapter which he so boldly titles ‘The Meaning of the Treaty’ [emphasis mine]. The first would be the deterioration in the understanding of individual rights, from their high point in the time of the Enlightenment, most especially as they were applied and articulated by John Locke and Thomas Jefferson (neither of whom merit a mention by Fletcher), down to the time of our Treaty when they were already under attack. The second is the consequent confusion (both in his text and the Treaty’s) over invidual and so-called “collective” rights, leaving unclear precisely what rights (and whose) are to be protected. In lieu of this “missing chapter” I’ve added a short section below expanding on those two points.

That said, with 528 pages of text (plus notes and Appendices) his argument seems well buttressed. And for the most part (at least until page 329, see below) it is well made. Since it overturns much previous thinking, it needs to be. In short, what Fletcher argues is that the Māori and English texts do reconcile; and that what was promised to Rangatira in both languages was continuing self-government. The first argument – and it is meticulously litigated -- overturns the scholarship and teaching of more than fifty years; the second emerges more as opinion, and will be much debated in coming years.

FLETCHER IS A SCION OF THE Fletcher family, son of Hugh and former Chief Justice Sian Elias, so his book – the product of a well-earned doctoral thesis -- would undoubtedly have made an impact even if it weren’t the well-researched tome that it is. The story he tells is through the eyes of both the lawyer he trained as, and the historian he became as he wrote it – with “the forensic exactitude I would expect of a Crown prosecutor who is at heart a historian” says Justice Joe Williams - the legal insights allowing him to challenge other historians on ground of which most had either made too little use, or were too unaware. 


What he gives us is a much fuller history of the ideas and people behind the words that were so widely debated around these islands in 1840. 

And blinking into the limelight steps the true author of Normanby’s instructions to Hobson, the Colonial Office lynchpin James Stephen – shy, high-minded, highly intelligent, married into the Christian Missionary Society who were already active here, and already accomplished (it is said that it was he who wrote, in just 48 hours, the 1933 Bill outlawing slavery in the British Empire). Fletcher makes plain that it is Stephen, along with Hobson and the aforementioned Busby, who must be recognised as the Treaty’s three undisputed framers. It was the Stephen the intellectual, through his written instructions to Hobson, (over the signature of the then Colonial Secretary the Marquess of Normanby), who was most responsible for 

  • the Treaty’s Preamble (recognising and offering protection to the just Rights and Property of Māori, and laws alike to the Native Population and to Her Subjects); 
  • for its First Article (asking that they cede sovereignty so that this might happen); and 
  • for the second half of Article Two (setting out the new government’s monopoly right in purchasing such lands of which Māori chieftains “may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon”).
These were the ideas that the Colonial Office most wished embraced by the signatories, that would allow Consul Hobson to become Lieutenant-Governor Hobson "of such territory that might be ceded" and to ensure Imperial control of colonisation.

It was Busby who took Hobson’s notes based on Stephen’s instructions – declaring them “not calculated to achieve the desired object” – and added what to Stephen's exalted mind might have been implicit but was important to make explicit: the fuller property rights protection in the Preamble and in Article Two (confirming “the full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries and other properties, which they may collectively or individually possess”), and the commitment to Māori in Article Three that they might enjoy “all the rights and privileges of British subjects.”[5]

It was Hobson, Fletcher documents, who brought the full text together again before passing it to missionary Henry Williams and his son Edward (said to have been the ace translator of the Ngapuhi dialect) to translate into Māori for signing. 

If New Zealand does have founding fathers on the British side, then these five -- along with “abductor and mystagogue” Edward Gibbon Wakefield, the driving force behind the New Zealand Company – would be leading figures in that Hall of Fame.

Fletcher ably brings out their contributions to what is said to be New Zealand’s founding document. This is among the book’s most valuable aspects, especially so for the as-yet little-acknowledged Stephen.

Important too is both Fletcher’s re-creation on pages 324-25 of ‘THE FINAL ENGLISH TEXT’ and his highlighting, on pages 480-81, of what translator Henry Williams “explained to the Natives” about the Treaty “and how they understood it.”[6] These should become the standard presentations of the English text, usurping more modern, ideologically-influenced translations.

Also notable is his lawyers-eye view of how poorly used and understood American case law was in colonial New Zealand and since. In fairness, the timeliness and accuracy of legal reporting at a time of slow and unreliable communication was not all it could be. But this failure is particularly important it the case of Johnson v M’Intosh ­­ -- oft then and since used to deny underlying Māori rights in land. Fletcher shows convincingly how this case especially was “misapplied to New Zealand circumstances and that their misuse was compounded by selective reading and misunderstandings of their effect.”[7] The ultimate result of this was, perhaps, the infamous 1877 case of Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (in which the Treaty was declared a “simple nullity”) and the gradual erosion of understanding of what the Treaty’s property rights protection meant for all New Zealanders.

A related and equally helpful point is his mature discussion (and general demolition) of the relevance to New Zealand law of the doctrine of discovery made famous by Emmerich de Vattel, unaccountably argued for today too often as the basis on which New Zealand was settled. Fletcher gives James Stephen himself the job of demolishing the idea of its influence at this time, Stephen reacting to news of the Treaty’s signing saying it gave proof, “if proof were wanting, how much wiser was the course taken negotiating for a Cession of the Sovereignty, than would have been the course of relying on the proceedings of Captain Cook [i.e., his claims of possession by discovery], or the language of Vattel, in opposition to our own Statute Book.”[8]

So there is much to like. Fletcher’s is a new view, one that needs to be wrestled with. For decades now, the understanding of the Treaty/Tiriti has been framed by Ruth Ross’s argument that the two versions are irreconcilable, Claudia Orange’s position that Te Tiriti sets up an ongoing relationship between government and Rangatira, and the Court of Appeal’s declaration that this relationship is “akin to a partnership.” 

Fletcher both builds on and challenges this paternalistic framing. (And he ignores the recent controversy over “sovereignty” as being too soon to comment). The principal conclusions of his thesis are, in his words:
  1. that rather than being at odds, the English and the Māori texts of the Treaty reconcile;
  2. that British intervention in New Zealand in 1840 was to establish government over British settlers, for the protection of Māori;
  3. further, that British settlement was to be promoted only to the extent that Māori protection was not compromised;
  4. that Māori tribal government and custom were to be maintained, and British sovereignty was not seen as inconsistent with this plurality in government and law;
  5. And that Māori were recognised as full owners of their lands, whether or not occupied by them, according to custom.[9]
These propositions, he claims, are what was offered and agreed to.

Propositions 1 and 5 can be agreed to and readily affirmed. It is Propositions 2 to 4 where Fletcher's radicalism quietly hits the road. Ever since Labour’s He Puapua document we’ve been debating co-governance – and then along comes Fletcher to tell us that the Treaty, the English version, insists upon a plurality of government, with colonial government only ever to be over settlers – with that government's primary aim being the continuing and ongoing protection of Māori. This is wild stuff indeed.

Bugger "partnership" -- this races past that and heads straight for the heady uplands of paternalism without end!

One senses however that, with an Introduction by Supreme Court Justice Joe Williams and endorsements already by the likes of senior historian Tony Ballantyne and former Waitangi Tribunal chair Eddie Durie, that Fletcher’s will quickly become the favoured mainstream interpretation of the Treaty.

But this doesn’t mean it’s correct....

DOWNLOAD THE FULL REVIEW HERE [pdf], or READ ON BELOW ...

=> PART TWO: Errors and Omissions
=> PART THREE: Getting Slippery With It
=> PART FIVE: Getting Rights Right
=> CONCLUSION: Rangatiratanga as Liberty


[1] W.P. Morrell, British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell, Frank Cass & Co., London, (1930), 1966, p. 103

[2] Morrell, pp 130-131

[3] Ned Fletcher, The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, (2022), p. 102, quoting (unattrib.) ‘Our Weekly Gossip,’ The Athenaum, No. 1866, (Aug 1, 1863), p. 150

[4] Fletcher, p. 103, quoting Trevor Williams, ‘James Stephens and British Intervention in New Zealand,’ Journal of Modern History, 13, 1 (1941), p. 25

[5] See below for the relevance of this. This is consistent with Ayn Rand’s view that, by the mid-nineteenth century, when the Treaty was being written, property rights in the sense of those written about by John Locke were at best assumed but rarely if ever fully defended. And they were also increasingly under attack, no less so than from Jeremy Bentham who declared property rights to be “nonsense on stilts.” Little wonder then that Stephen, who “must be classed among [Bentham’s] utilitarians” (Knaplund, p. 15), overlooked in his drafted instructions to Hobson any reference to rights beyond an “admission” of the rights of sovereignty already acknowledged in the 1835 Declaration of Independence. 

[6] Fletcher, p. 480

[7] Fletcher, p. 359

[8] Colonial Office minutes, 9 & 10 July 1840, CO 209/6, 33b. Quoted by Fletcher, p. 340. And yes, there is a distinction to be drawn between those areas of these islands in which discovery was claimed as the basis of sovereignty, most especially the South Island, but these are fully discussed in the text. And no, as Fletcher makes clear these claims didn’t rely on Vattel.

[9] Fletcher, p. 17 


Thursday, 25 January 2024

How altruism helped (re)create an aristocracy

 


The humanitarian impulse of the Aborigines' Protection Society helped embed privilege
across Britain's colonies, says the book's author, "whatever the colour of its skin"

"From 1836 to 1909 the Aborigines' Protection Society lobbied the British Colonial Office to defend the rights of aboriginal people. ... The background of the Aborigines' Protection Society's work was the growth of the British Empire in the nineteenth century. ... [Their generosity, though, fell short of respect, seeing native peoples as something like children, in need of protection rather than rights.]
    "The Aborigines' Protection Society was tied up in the New Zealand colony from the outset. ... Wakefield's early interesting in controlling emigration gave him common outlook with the Aborigines' Protection Society ... To get a clearer idea of what Wakefield was thinking, following his talks with [Aborigines' Protection Society head Thomas] Hodgkin, we can read his evidence to the [UK] parliamentary Select Committee around the same time (1840): 'if the inferior race of New Zealand can be preserved at all in contact with civilised men it can only be by creating ... a Native aristocracy, a Native gentry ...'
    "The Society's ... Reverend Montague Hawtrey ... persuaded the Colonial Undersecretary James Stephen that the Māori people ought to be 'looked after' in the new colony and 'saved from the impact of commerce.' ... Hawtrey, like Hodgkin, tried to get Wakefield to work the protection of the native Māori into his scheme of Systematic Colonisation. ... 
    "Hawtrey thought New Zealanders ought to pay homage to the native chiefs. 'Even if there were no chiefs in New Zealand it would be,' he wrote, 'judicious to select certain personages from among them and place them in a position of honour.' The reason was that there had to to be 'a class of persons in the island who, by common consent and prescriptive right hold a position onf eminence above the others.' That was true of the Europeans too ... Hawtrey thought ...
    "In the end, Hawtrey's loyalty was to privilege, whatever the colour of its skin. ...
    "As David Cannadine explains, 'It was these people--the chiefs, landowners, sultans or sheikhs--on whom the British felt they could rely, and with whom ... they were most comfortable'. ...
    "The Aborigines' Protection Society helped make the case for the Treaty, and for the colonisation that it licensed."

~ James Heartfield, from his book The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836-1909 [pp. vii, 67, 126-9]. As we've said before about the Treaty, it's the "chieftainship" that's the problem...

"Arguing against the views of Edward Said and others, Cannadine suggests that the
British were motivated not only by race, but also by class. The British wanted to
domesticate the exotic world of their colonies and to reorder the societies they
ruled according to an idealised image of their own class hierarchies."

Tuesday, 16 January 2024

History without Economic Literacy


"Once I started studying economics, however, I was outraged by the economic illiteracy of my history textbooks. Mainstream historians barely mentioned the [Industrial Revolution's] unprecedented miracle of sustained economic growth. Instead, they focused on distribution: How poor workers used labor unions and regulation to pry their fair share from the heartless capitalists who employed them. These historians never mentioned the negative side effects of unionization and labor market regulation – or even the view that such negative side effects existed. My historical mis-education eventually inspired my lecture on 'Why the Standard History of Labor Is Wrong.'
    "Every now and then, though, I question the accuracy of my memory. Could my history textbooks really have been so awful? The other night, overcome by nostalgia, I decided to check....
"The good news: My memory turns out to be quite accurate. The bad news: [the] economic illiteracy is more severe than I thought. The more economics you know, the worse [it] seems....
"So what should history textbooks say about these matters? This: Working conditions during the early Industrial Revolution were bad by modern standards, but a major improvement by the standards of the time. Factory work looked good to people raised on backbreaking farm labor – and it looked great to the many immigrants who flocked to the rising centers of industry from all over the world. This alliance of entrepreneurs, inventors, and workers peacefully kickstarted the modern world that we enjoy today.
    "And what of the 'workers’ movement'? A halfway decent textbook would emphasize that it wasn’t quantitatively important. Few workers belonged, and they didn’t get much for their efforts. Indeed, “workers’ movement” is a misnomer; labor unions didn’t speak for most workers, and were often dominated by leftist intellectuals. A fully decent textbook would discuss the many possible negative side effects of labor market regulation and unionization – so students realize that the critics of economic populism were neither knaves nor fools.
    "The Big Picture: Industrialization was the greatest event in human history. Critics then and now were foolishly looking a gift horse in the mouth. Until every student knows these truths by heart, history teachers have not done their job.

~ Bryan Caplan, from his post 'The Economic Illiteracy of High School History'





Monday, 10 July 2023

"...New Zealand could hardly have developed as a high-income country."

 

"[I]f enterprise in 19th century New Zealand had operated under anything comparable to the legal requirements regarding conservation [and the environment] imposed on it today, and had it been confronted by comparably eager 'watchdog' groups [or political parties] anxious for their pound of flesh, New Zealand could hardly have developed as a high-income country. One need only reflect that the process of farm formation over much of the North Island, which involved burning down a large proportion of the bush cover, would have been quite impossible."

~ John Gould, from his 1985 book The Muldoon Years: An Essay on New Zealand's Recent Economic Growth

Thursday, 16 February 2023

"'We broke the welfare culture of the Tahltan Nation forever.’ A single message reverberates not only across North America, but globally: 'If the Tahltan can do it, any Indigenous Nation can do it!’"

 

"In 1983 and 1984, 80% of the Tahltan Nation [of northern British Columbia] were on welfare, and unemployment stood at 98%, following the dispossession of property and other human rights across spanning generations. Severe alcohol and drug problems characterised social life, along with high suicide rates and very low levels of educational attainment.
    "By 2013, it had all changed: 100% employment, zero suicides and an above-the-national-average graduation rate, from universities to trade schools.
    "[The tribe's] Chief Asp was clear that wealth was always to be created and could never be taken. Federal funding was firmly declined and returned to the government, along with all conditions it required.... Today funds are independently generated in the marketplace....
    "Equity rights and land titles were key components of wealth creation, including the tradability of those equity rights within the framework established by the Tahltan Central Government– undertaken to protect ‘the Tahltan inherent aboriginal rights and title’ and ‘the eco-systems and natural resources of Tahltan traditional territory.'
    "Traded rights have not only been an economic tool, but generated resources for improved environmental outcomes ...
    "From 98% unemployment to zero, Chief Asp concludes ... : 'We broke the welfare culture of the Tahltan Nation forever.’ A single message reverberates not only across North America, but globally: 'If the Tahltan can do it, any Indigenous Nation can do it!’"

Monday, 13 February 2023

"In reality, the long history of unionisation ... is replete with homegrown racism..." [updated]


"In reality, the long history of unionisation in the United States is replete with homegrown racism, as organised labor has sought to increase white workers’ wages by driving African Americans out of the competitive workforce. Many early-20th-century union initiatives, including working-hour restrictions, minimum wages, and collectively codified seniority privileges for existing workers allowed organisers to cartelise white labor against wage competition from African Americans and immigrants. The mostly white union sector benefited from artificially higher pay under these measures, whereas blacks found themselves excluded from employment entirely."
~ Phil Magness, from his article 'The 1619 Project's Confusion on Capitalism'
“It’s impossible to understand early twentieth-century progressives without eugenics. Even worker-friendly reforms like the minimum wage were part of a racial hygiene agenda… The minimum wage, in addition to providing some workers with a better standard of living, would guard white men from competition.”
~ Malcolm Harris from his article 'The Dark History of Liberal Reform', reviewing the book Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics & American Economics in the Progressive Era  
"Racist views were widespread in New Zealand [too] during the nineteenth century but it was in the Labour movement that these views received their fullest expression. The emotive appeal of nationalism, the social Darwinist vision of the battle of the races and feared economic competition fused in the Labour movement to produce a series of anti- Chinese campaigns. Racism in the Labour movement peaked in the early twentieth century when the White New Zealand policy was established. Regulations which discriminated against groups on a racial basis were a feature of trade unionism in New Zealand from its early beginnings and these policies were defended in this period with great vigour by Labour racists."
~ G.R. Warburton, from his 1982 Masters thesis 'The Attitudes and Policies of the New Zealand Labour Movement toward Non-Union Immigration to New Zealand, 1878 - 1928' (p. 179)
"The Auckland Labour MPs were spurred by the Grocers' Assistants and the Furniture Trade Union into sending a telegram to [then] Prime Minister [Massey] protesting that all this cheap [foreign] labour would lower living standards and probably lead to deterioration of the physical vigour of the race. M. J. Savage was particularly alarmist. The teeming millions of the East were less than a stone's throw away and New Zealand was faced by a rushing horde of Asiatics which it must try to stem both by laws of its own and by negotia- tions with Asian governments themselves. The Auckland Water-siders also recorded their fears for the living standards of the workers and their abhorrence of the 'piebald New Zealand' which now threatened..."
~. P.S. O'Connor, citing Auckland Star reports from 1920, from his 1968 article 'Keeping New Zealand White, 1908-1920'

 UPDATE:

The airbrush has been applied to some of this history. As Duncan B. points out, this verse from long-lived Australian folk song 'Travelling Down the Castlereagh'* has been bowdlerised in recent years:
I asked a cove for shearin' once along the Marthaguy
"We shear non-union here," says he. "I call it scab," says I
I looked along the shearin' floor before I turned to go
There were eight or ten non-union men a-shearin' in a row
The original verse ended:
There were eight or ten dashed Chinamen a-shearin' in a row
"Pretty clear from the original, says Duncan, "what the union was about, at least in part."
* First published under the title 'The Bushman's Song in the Bulletin in 1892. This poem of Banjo Paterson's has grown a number of tunes in its time in the bush. Meredith collected three tunes in NSW, and two tunes are given in the Queensland Centenary Pocket Songbook while in his Big Book of Australian Folk Song Ron Edwards gives another two. This tune is the one most commonly sung today, and was collected separately by Geoff Wills and John Manifold. Manifold got it from Mr Hines of Donald, Victoria, it is in his Penguin Australian Song Book.
See also 'The Bushman's Song' in the Evening News 1870.